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1. Introduction 
Although the discussion about what heterodox economics is has yet to be settled (see 
e.g. Mearman 2012; Mearman/Berger/Guizzo 2019), it appears safe to say that all non-
mainstream approaches are united in their rejection of neoclassical economics, 
addressing unemployment as a failure of real-wage-driven labour markets to clear at the 
equilibrium wage rate determined by marginal productivity and marginal utility. In this 
theoretical exposition, unfettered labour markets will always show a tendency towards  
market clearing – excluding involuntary unemployment as a substantial phenomenon 
beyond temporary (cyclical) disequilibrium or frictional occurrence. The existence of 
long-term mass unemployment in all highly developed capitalist economies over most 
periods of their recent history, i.e. the obvious divergence of theoretical ex ante 
predictions from real-world experience, can be considered one of the very driving forces 
behind the establishment of alternative theories: according to Thomas S. Kuhn (1962), 
the failure to pass the empirical test of theoretical prediction classified as an ‘anomaly’ 
can trigger scientific revolutions in the sense that, eventually, new theoretical  
approaches – paradigms – will take over1 once they provide theoretical solutions that 
better explain (ex post) what was formerly an ‘anomaly’.  The publication of Kuhn’s  
Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the early 1960s reinforced the motivation of many 
heterodox economists 2 to be part of such a revolution in their academic field. 
Although Kuhn cannot be blamed for being overly naive about the willingness of 
protagonists of a ‘paradigm in crisis’ to defend it by refining or marginally correcting it, 
his focus was on change, not continuity. Therefore, he might have underestimated or, 
at least under-emphasised the resilience of a paradigm – particularly in the social 
sciences, where the famous ‘Duhem-Quine’ critique points to the impossibility of an 
outright empirical falsification of entire paradigms. Merely single causal statements can 
be rejected on empirical grounds demanding, at least, some defending ‘repair work’ in 
the underlying structures (assumptions) of the paradigm. With respect to neoclassical 
labour market theory, myriads of attempts have been made to reconcile ex post 
theoretical prediction with empirical evidence. Assumptions have been rectified in order 
to render the simple supply-and-demand model of the labour market more realistic: 
skipping the assumption of perfect competition, for instance, allows the deviation of the 
                                                                 
1 Sheila Dow (in: Merman/Berger/Guizzo 2019: 28) nicely points out the fact that scientific 
‚revolutions‘ should not be understood as immediate, sudden and dramatic break but rather a 
generational shift of paradigms „that if you look at a discipline or a school of thought of one point in 
time and than look at it, say, two decades later, understandings, meanings, frameworks may have 
changed completely“.   
2 Although the term ‚heterodox economist‘ had obviously been used as early as the 1930s (see Ayres 
1936), it fell into disuse thereafter for a long time. Therefore, economists dissatisfied with 
neoclassical economics in the early 1960s would not have referred to themselves as ‚heterodox 
economists‘. 
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real wage from its market-clearing level to be explained as rational maximisation 
behaviour in monopolies, ‘right-to-manage’ or ‘insider–outsider’ models. Lifting the 
assumption of perfect knowledge paves the way for ‘incomplete contract’ models that 
give rise to the emergence of efficiency wages above the market-clearing level in order 
to prevent the workers from shirking. Finally, introducing transaction cost (e.g. mobility 
or information cost) enables economists to produce ‘job search’ models that explain 
‘equilibrium’ unemployment, where unemployment co-exists with vacancies of equal 
magnitude. Although some of these revisions of the simple labour market model appear 
somewhat artificial, they have served its purpose: to reconcile theoretical prediction (ex 
post) with empirical reality.3 
2. Change and continuity: minimum wages, predictions from 
neoclassical labour market theory and empirical reality 
Having survived the real-world test of long-term unemployment, neoclassical labour 
market theory came under severe pressure after its theoretical (ex ante) prediction of 
the employment effects of the introduction of minimum wages was entirely nullified by 
empirical research: 
Economists have conducted hundreds of studies of the employment impact 
of the minimum wage. Summarizing those studies is a daunting task, but two 
recent meta-studies analyzing the research conducted since the early 1990s 
concludes that the minimum wage has little or no discernible effect on the 
employment prospects of low-wage workers. (Schmitt 2013: 22) 
It has been argued that minimum wage research has put neoclassical labour market 
theorizing in a rather awkward position (see Heise 2019):  for a theoretical approach 
which either postulates clear and substantial negative employment effects of minimum 
wages (competitive model) or clear and substantial positive employment effects 
(monopsonistic model), these empirical findings – which are entirely replicated by the 
concomitant minimum wage research on the recent introduction of a statutory, 
economy-wide minimum wage in Germany in 20154 – can be seen as falsification in the 
worst case or, at least, as yet another severe ‘anomaly’5 of neoclassical labour market 
theory demanding further re-consideration of its theoretical basis.             
                                                                 
3 This is, of course, not to say that these models correctly explain the real-world phenomenon of 
‘unemployment’, but only that the existence of unemployment does not objectively falsify 
neoclassical labour market theory. ‘Non-falsification’ does not mean ‘proof’.  
4 See the evaluation of the German Minimum Wage Commission, which was established in order to 
accompany the introduction of the minimum wage in Germany by conducting research on its own 
and commissioning and collecting concomitant minimum wage research: e.g. Zilius/Bruttel 2018.  
5 The literature on monopsonistic labour markets has been put forward in order to cope with the 
‘anomaly’ of minimum wages having no discernible effect on employment. The idea was to show 
that minimum wages must not necessarily – as in the competitive model – produce negative effects. 
But the prediction of the monopsonistic model is one not of a neutral employment effect but rather 
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In order to better understand and rate the efforts of labour market economists faced 
with the situation at hand, it appears helpful – particularly given the historical resilience 
of neoclassical labour market research noted above – to rely not on the theorist of 
change, Thomas Samuel Kuhn, but rather on the theorist of scientific resilience: the 
Polish bacteriologist and sociologist of science Ludwik Fleck. According to Fleck (1979), 
there are three potential paths 6 for dealing with anomalies such as that facing 
neoclassical labour market theorizing: the most common would probably be to 
supplement the existing theoretical body in order to reconcile theoretical prediction 
with empirical evidence (thought style supplementation). Bruttel/Baumann/Dütsch 
(2019) hint at such a strategy when they mention other ‘channels of adaptation’ to 
minimum wages than quantity (employment) adjustments: (1) an increase in labour 
productivity to keep higher (minimum) wages profitable; (2) a reduction in working 
hours to keep employment constant at lower activity level and (3) an increase in prices 
to keep real wages unaltered. Yet neither theoretical reflection nor empirical 
investigation support this kind of defence: (1) theoretically, the productivity increase 
appears to be something of a deus ex machina, since any such productivity reserve 
should have been teased out of the production process by competition anyway without 
necessitating minimum wages as a trigger. Moreover, empirical studies show no 
increase in productivity due to the introduction of a minimum wage in Germany after 
2015 (see Bossler/Gürtzgen/Lochner et al. 2018) or elsewhere (Sabia 2015). (2) Reducing 
working hours could potentially overcome the anomaly in question when it is not the 
number of jobs (employment) but the number of hours that is reduced as a consequence 
of the increase in the hourly real wage rate. And, although there is reported evidence 
                                                                 
of employment effects depending on the level of the minimum wage: a minimum wage only slightly 
higher than the wage rate set monopsonistically will produce significant positive employment 
effects. A minimum wage much higher than the monopsonistically set wage rate will produce 
substantial negative effects, and only a very specific wage rate that is not too high and not too low 
will produce neutral employment effects. That is to say, in order to explain the manifest empirical 
result of a neutral employment effect, either the minimum wage must just be set at a very specific 
level if we assume monopsonistic labour markets to be the rule or an even more specific level if we 
assume labour markets to be competitive in some sectors and monopsonistic in others. In that case, 
the minimum wage must just reach a level at which the positive employment effects of the 
monopsonistic labour markets compensate the negative employment effects of the competitive 
labour markets. Assuming ‘monopsonistic’ labour markets merely to mean not a single employer in 
the literal sense of the word ‘mono’ but a low wage-elasticity of labour supply giving employers a 
limited amount of wage-setting power (‘quasi-monopsony’) and assuming that elasticities will be 
different in every quasi-monopsonistic sector (see e.g. Bachmann/Frings 2015 for Germany), the 
specificity of a minimum wage exclusively producing neutral employment effects must be even 
higher. The likelihood that any minimum wage has ever just met these specificities cannot be rated 
as high; the likelihood that the minimum wages around the globe have all been set just at that specific 
level is surely close to zero.       
6 There is one more path which will not be considered here, as it appears to be the most stubborn,  
least constructive approach: denying the empirical invalidation of the theoretical prediction (in the 
case of Germany, this approach is taken by Knabe/Schöb/Thum2020).  
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that companies reduced the contracted working hours of low-paid workers after the 
introduction of minimum wages in Germany, there is no evidence of a reduction in the 
actual performed hourly volume of labour in the economy after the introduction of 
minimum wages in 2015. (3) Of course, if the increase in hourly wages could simply be 
rolled over into prices, the real (hourly) wage would remain constant and no quantity 
adjustment would need to follow. And although there is evidence that this is what we 
have actually experienced in Germany, this is hardly reconcilable with neoclassical 
labour market theory: here, companies are modelled as ‘price takers’ and ‘quantity 
adjusters’. The price of each good is determined in the commodity market under given 
conditions of supply and demand. If the commodity market is taken as perfectly 
competitive, no single company can set the price. If the commodity market is taken as 
imperfect, the price will be set at a level above marginal productivity, including a mark 
up reflecting the degree of market imperfection. After all, as long as the commodity 
market’s structure does not change, there is no way companies could simply increase 
commodity prices without inhibiting profit maximisation.7  
To summarise, we are inclined to follow Ludwik Fleck (1979:27), who anticipated such 
‘repair work’ on the paradigm and would have considered it to be merely “laborious 
efforts (…) to explain an exception” in order to stabilise and defend a ‘paradigm in crisis’.  
A much deeper cut could be expected from a paradigmatic shift in approaching the 
problem at hand (thought style transformation), such as taking a heterodox perspective 
(see e.g. Heise 2018; Heise/Pusch 2019; Herr/Kazandziska 2011) radically challenging 
conventional wisdom (‘the mainstream’ or ‘standard economics’) and thus potentially 
triggering a scientific revolution in the Kuhnian sense. However, assuming, to cite Ludwik 
Fleck, strong ‘thought style compulsion’, this approach will be considered very risky by 
most economists and only serve as a last resort after other, more thought style-
compatible approaches have been pursued.8  
Hence a third avenue may be taken: extending the ‘simple’ model in order to match it 
closer with reality (thought style extension).9         
                                                                 
7 Alan B. Krueger (2018: 267) points out that in the ‘real world’ most companies act within imperfect 
markets and should rather be taken as price-setters; however, he refers to labour, not commodity 
markets and thus ‘price-setters’ means ‘wage-setters’ in this context. If the power of setting wages 
is restricted by minimum wage legislation, this does not simply translate into higher power to set 
prices in the commodity market. 
8 Interestingly, the literature evaluating employment forecasts of minimum wages mentions these 
heterodox studies only in passing and entirely neglects them when drawing conclusions from their 
evaluations; see e.g. Bruttel/Baumann/Dütsch 2019. 
9 The idea of basing a model on labour market imperfections – i.e. the monopsonistic labour market 
model exposed in footnote 5 – must also be included in the type of scientific reaction dubbed  
‘thought style extension’. However, for the reasons given in footnote 5, it cannot really be considered 
a successful extension convincingly reconciling theoretical prediction with empirical evidence, but is 
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3. A labour market model including frictions – a useful extension for 
rescuing neoclassical labour market economics? 
In a recent paper, Braun/Döhrn/Krause et al. appear to have set themselves exactly this 
kind of task when they state:  
There is […] a consensus among labor economists that these neoclassic 
models are an overly simplistic representation of the economy. 
(Braun/Döhrn/Krause et al. 2019: 3)  
In a very stylized, yet thorough way, Braun/Döhrn/Krause et al. (2019) extend the 
‘simple’ neoclassical model of the labour market into a complex two-sector model 
allowing searches and matching frictions. The gist of the extension can be summarised 
as follows: the level of actual employment is not only determined by real wage-driven 
labour supply and demand, but also by job searches, vacancy creation and 
corresponding activities.  
In this setting (see fig 1.), employment depends not solely on aspects of productivity and 
utility (LD and LS as in the simple model), but also on a complex interaction between job 
searches and corresponding activities by the labour market actors (effective job 
contracts Le) explaining vacancy creation, separation and finding rates. As a result, even 
when the wage rate happens to be at the market-clearing level ((w/P)*), the actual 
number of job contracts effectively closed at any time (L1) will be lower than at the 
potential full employment level (L*), leaving some job seekers unemployed alongside 
the same number of vacancies at the company level (L*–L1). This type of frictional 
unemployment – which will always occur when we assume imperfect information about 
the characteristics and distribution of jobs and job seekers in the labour market10 – is 
entirely compatible with the ‘Beveridge definition’ of full employment.11 
If we assume the job search and vacancy creation activities to be positively correlated 
with the real wage rate12 and the real wage rate to be negatively correlated with labour 
                                                                 
rather seen as being merely a variant of the ordinary model. For instance, Knabe/Schöb/Thum (2014) 
– in an influential study for opponents of the introduction of a minimum wage in Germany – based 
their predictions on both variants: assuming a competitive labour market environment in Germany, 
they predicted job losse of around 900,000 (or about 2.5% of the German work force), while in a 
monopsonistic setting, the predicted job loss would still be substantial but clearly lower: about 
420,000 (or 1.2% of the German work force).   
10 This is not at all new to labour economics (see Reder 1969), but has not been related to the 
minimum wage literature before. 
11 According to William Beveridge (1945: 18), a situation of full employment is reached whenever the 
number of unemployed workers is matched with the number of vacancies available. 
12 Job search and vacancy creation combine to determine effective job contracting. A rise in the real 
wage rate will increase opportunity cost of unemployment and therefore positively relate the real 
wage rate with workers’ job search activities, while it may increase opportunity cost of vacancies and 
therefore negatively relate the real wage rate with vacancy creation by firms.   
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demand (or job offers), it is unclear how many job contracts become effective – and thus 
how many workers are without a job. Likewise, the effect of introducing a minimum 
wage exceeding its equilibrium level ((w/P)1) also remains uncertain13: real-wage-
related employment offers will fall (L3 and ‘classical’ unemployment will rise to L4–L3), 
yet effective job contracting may rise (L2 and thus frictional unemployment will fall to 
L3–L2), leaving the actual employment (and unemployment) impact of minimum wages 
dependent on the relative strength of both reactions.14 
Figure 1: The neoclassical labour market with frictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to decide on the impact of the introduction of a minimum wage of the 
magnitude experienced in Germany in 2015, Braun/Döhrn/Krause et al. therefore run 
simulations based on a one-sector and a two-sector labour market model15 with frictions 
using calibrations for those parameters determining the relative strength of both 
reactions – the calibrations are drawn from the literature. The results are compared with 
simulations based on a ‘simple’ neoclassical labour market model without frictions.         
                                                                 
13 Hence, Braun/Döhrn/Krause et al. (2019: 20) state: „The effects of introducing a binding minimum 
wage on equilibrium outcomes are too complex to analytically analyze. Hence, we turn to a 
quantitative analysis“. 
14 In fig. 1, classical unemployment L4 – L3 plus frictional unemplyoment L3 – L2 in a minimum wage 
setting appear to be substantially higher than frictional unemployment L* - L1 in equilibrium without 
a minimum wage. But clearly, the result is different if the slopes of the curves would change. 
15 The two-sector model distinguishes between a sector using high qualified labour (i.e. low 
exposition to minimum wages) and another sector using low qualified labour (i.e. high exposition to 
minimum wages). 
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It is one thing to scrutinise the results of complex simulations, but another to draw 
conclusions from such simulations. It is the latter which requires some qualification in 
the case of the Braun/Döhrn/Krause et al. article: they conclude that the results of the 
two models – the simple neoclassical one and the extended model including frictions 
both in the 1-sector and the 2-sector variations – are similar in terms of the unambiguity 
and substantiality with respect to the negative employment effect of introducing a 
minimum wage, although the magnitudes differ slightly: in the 2-sector labour market 
model with frictions, employment after 5 years will be 2.7% lower after the introduction 
of a minimum wage, while it will be 3.4% lower if a simple 2-sector neoclassical model 
is used. This result is due to the dominance of the ordinary price-quantity channel over 
the other possible channels of influence, such as the job search or vacancy creation 
channels. 
4. Concluding remarks 
Of course, once the complexity of a model is increased, the number of possible effects 
of introducing a minimum wage is also increased – at best opening the model for real-
world phenomena which had previously been neglected. However, the fact that the 
extensions of the simple neoclassical model do not substantially modify the negative 
employment effect of minimum wages as its most important feature renders this kind 
of thought style extension futile: it cannot ‘heal’ the empirical falsification of its model 
prediction. Or, to put it differently: the only merit of the Braun/Döhrn/Krause et al. 
article is to show that extensions of the simple neoclassical labour market model in a 
direction incorporating real-world frictions still cannot deliver what is promised: a more 
useful representation of the economy in line with empirical evidence. Moreover, if the 
core prediction of a model is drawn into doubt, all other insights of the model – i.e. the 
alleged importance of labour market and social policies for the effect of minimum wages 
– must also be treated with great care and scientific reservation. 
Therefore, the main conclusion from the Braun/Döhrn/Krause et al. paper is that the 
long-term macroeconomic effects of the German minimum wage should not be 
evaluated on the basis of an extended 1-or 2-sector neoclassical labour market model, 
whether it includes frictions or not. From a political perspective, this implies that no 
policy recommendations should be drawn from a theoretical basis which differs so 
alarmingly from real-world experiences. From a scientific perspective, researchers 
should be prepared to more radically question a thought style which – even if 
supplemented and extended – cannot be brought in line with reality unless they are 
prepared to fall victim to what Ludwik Fleck has called a ‘harmony of deception’. 
However, this would be even more unacceptable, as there are alternative approaches 
which appear to be far better ‘representations of the economy’ than any 
supplementation or extension of neoclassical labour market economics. 
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